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Complementarity or Disparity? The UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration 1985 and English Arbitration Act 1996 revisited.   
 
                                            Bukola Faturoti1  
 
Abstract 
Interest in the use of arbitration as a mechanism for resolving commercial 
disputes has grown tremendously in the last two decades.  This growth could 
be credited to the awareness by national governments and international 
bodies to change the culture of strict litigation and allow parties some 
autonomy in resolving their disputes. Both UNCITRAL Law International 
Commercial Arbitration and English Arbitration Act 1996 have changed 
disputing-resolving culture in business environment. This article revisits the 
relationship of these two systems of arbitration and examines the extent they 
have contributed to the development of use arbitration across different 
commercial terrain.  
 
I. Introduction 
The past two decades have seen great strides towards the establishment of the ‘global 
village’ market place. With advancement in technology resulting in a new global 
business paradigm, various trade and governmental bodies such as Word Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the mechanism created by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the Economic Committee of West African States (ECOWAS) 
to mention a few, have intensified effort to end protectionism, establish liberalized 
cross border trade and put an end to the prevalence of beggar-thy-neighbour economic 
policies. While these efforts have been hugely successful, trade barriers are being 
erected in an unlikely place – international commercial arbitration. Although 
international arbitration has been a beneficiary of international consensus towards 
integration (i.e. The New York Convention), barriers have been erected because of 
conflicting national arbitral rules, applicability of substantive and procedural law, 
forum shopping, unenforceability of arbitration agreements and resulting arbitral 
awards (especially against state parties) etc. 
 
Commercial parties are wary of being dragged before a foreign court or the court of 
the country of the other party where they have little or no knowledge of its language 
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and legal procedure. (Commercial) arbitration and other forms of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) afford parties the opportunity to avoid lengthy, and costly legal 
appearances which characterise litigation. 2  “In arbitration, the parties voluntarily 
agree to refer their existing or future disputes to a third party for determination and 
they agree in advance to accept the arbitrator’s decision as final and binding”.3 The 
widely accepted advantages of arbitration over litigation are confidentiality, choice of 
procedure, choice of forum, a choice of how the dispute will be adjudicated and a 
choice of arbitrator(s). However, these advantages are repeatedly being called into 
question because arbitration laws and rules differ from one legal jurisdiction to 
another and offer diverse challenges to commercial parties.  
  
The best two known systems for international commercial arbitration are the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the English Arbitration Act 1996. This essay’s main 
focus is to comparatively analyse both systems and answer the following questions: 
Are the two systems complimentary of are there major areas of differences especially 
in light of the need to protect the sanctity of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate? What 
influenced the enactment of the Model Law and the 1996 Act? Is the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 really preferable to the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 as a system for the resolution of arbitration disputes?  
How valid are the reasons for non adoption of the Model Law by England or was it an 
exercise borne out of legislative arrogance? Are these systems capable to continue to 
drive arbitration in the twenty first century?  
 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 as amended in 2006 (the Model 
Law) is one of the responses by the United Nations to help in fostering international 
trade especially in the area of international commercial dispute resolution.  The Model 
Law aims to achieve harmonization among nations’ arbitration laws and remove 
                                                 
2 It is not settled whether arbitration should be classified along other forms of ADR such as mediation, 
conciliation or along with litigation. While some see this classification as mere academic distinction, 
others regard it necessary for characteristic reasons. See Roberts, S & Palmer, M. (2005) Dispute 
Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision Making Cambridge University Press for 
comprehensive discussions on all forms of dispute resolution and their development around the world. 
3 Zhaodong Jiang, “Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings”, 23 LOY. L.A.L REV 473, 
474 (1990) cited in Jurgen Nanne Koberg, “Costa Rican Commercial Arbitration Rules and the U.S. 
Federal Arbitration Act”  ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law (1996) Vol. 3 No.1  
p.32 
 3
disparity which has been the cause of uncertainty for business parties. It also has 
among its objective to remedy the inadequacies found in many domestic laws. The 
English Arbitration Act (the 1996 Act) was enacted eleven years after the emergence 
of the Model Law.  In as much that the Model Law aims to ensure uniformity, it 
would be expected that the English Arbitration Act of 1996 would follow the Model 
Law in its provisions.  The 1996 Act aims to respond to the contemporary demands of 
international commercial dispute resolution by removing some of the scepticisms 
brought about the persistent of judicial intervention.   
 
This essay is divided into five parts. Part II of this essay traces the emergence of the 
Model Law especially the uniformity that prompted its making while Part III provides 
some highlights on the act of consolidation and need for reform which influenced the 
enactment of the English Arbitration Act.  There are selective comparative analyses of 
selected issues like scope of application, separability and court intervention etc under 
both systems in Part IV, and Part V is the conclusion.  
 
II. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration  
Following a proposal by Hungary which urged the United Nations to be actively 
involved in removal of legal hindrances to the flow in international trade, 
UNCITRAL was established in 1966 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
The purpose is to “have for its object the promotion of the progressive4 harmonisation 
and unification of the law of international trade”.5 The problem with international 
arbitration is that parties are always pessimistic about the law of the country of other 
party, not solely based on fear of not getting a fair decision but the strangeness of its 
principles in its entirety. To alleviate such fears, in 1982 the UNCITRAL Working 
Group began deliberations on the Model Law and this was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on 11 December 1985 by consensus resolution 40/72. The 
Model Law is predicated on solving the problems of inadequacy of domestic laws and 
disparity between national laws.6 Article 2A of the 2006 version provides that:   
                                                 
4 Emphasis supplied 
5United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Yearbook Vol. I: 1968-1970 (cited as 
Yearbook) 65 1971. See generally E.A. Farnsworth, “UNCITRAL- WHY? WHAT? HOW? WHEN?” 
20 American Journal of Comparative Law Quarterly 34(1987) 
6 See Background to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as 
highlighted in the main text itself. Available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-
arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf  accessed on 2 February 2012  
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(1) In the interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its international origin and to the 
need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith. 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Law which are not expressly settled in it 
are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which this Law is based. 
 
Principles of uniformity and internationalisation rather than nationalisation are at the 
heart of the Model Law. In other word, though the Law may be domesticated as a 
legislative instrument; it will give birth to consistent interpretation among state parties 
and will alleviate the fear of uncertainty among commercial users. Lord Justice Kerr 
expatiates further that:  
 [T]he concept underlying the Model Law is to put an end to this state of affairs by widening  
the parties’  choice of venue and thus their choice  of arbitration clauses for incorpora- 
tion to their contracts. In so far as a country will have enacted legislation based on the  
Model Law, both parties will be able to find it easier to accept arbitration in that coun- 
try,  because they will know basically where they stand.7 
 
The Model Law is not a convention but an international persuasive legislation;8 state 
parties have no treaty obligation to enact legislation in accordance with its terms. 
State parties can decide to modify it or adopt it wholly as a template for their national 
arbitration law. Around 70 countries have adopted with or without amendments have 
adopted the Model Law; among them are Australia, Canada, China(Hong Kong), 
Egypt, Japan, Germany, Nigeria, and Russia.9 Seven states from the United States of 
America have also followed suit. 10  The Model Law applies to international 
commercial arbitration only. Its features include liberal character; restriction of the 
role of court, emphasis on fairness and due process; provisions assisting the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, short text and simple language are 
among others. The Model Law entails two groups of articles viz: those which deal 
various aspects of the initiation of the reference and those which create an exclusive 
regime for judicial intervention in arbitration matters. While it was regarded as a 
coherent whole document, whose part must not be dismembered to retain its 
harmonising trait; in some circles, other opinions suggested that States have a wide 
latitude to determine what they would make out of it. 
 
                                                 
7 Micheal Kerr “Arbitration and the Courts: the UNCITRAL Model Law” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 34 (1985) p 7 
8 Andrew Okekeifere, Appointment and Challenge of Arbitrators Under the UNCITRAL Model Law 
Part 1: Agenda for Improvement, 2(5/6) Int’l A.L.R 167 (1999) 
9 Available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html  
accessed on 2 February 2012  
10 They are California, Connecticut, Florida, Illnois, Louisiana, Oregon and Texas.  
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III. The English Arbitration Act 1996 
Upon appointment in March 1985 by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry for 
the United Kingdom, the Departmental Advisory Committee (DAC) on International 
Commercial Arbitration under the chairmanship of the Rt. Hon Lord Justice Mustill 
published a consultative document. The document considered required modifications 
to the Model Law before its incorporation into the laws of the United Kingdom. Sir 
Johan Steyn, a member of the DAC, argued that the UK should not adopt the Model 
Law because so many necessary additions and variation would diminish the very 
concept of the Model Law.11 By and large, the DAC in its Report of June 1989 
decided not to adopt the Model Law but rather to enact a new Arbitration Act which 
set out in logical order and succinct language the important principles of the English 
Law of arbitration.12 The DAC took cognisance of the fact that, though the principles 
of English arbitration law had advanced beyond the frontiers of the Model Law, not 
all of the developments in English arbitration law had been welcome by the 
international community.13 The 1996 Act should be made a confluence of all existing 
English statutory arbitration law; English arbitration case law and relevant Model 
Law provisions.14  
 
The 1996 Act is built around three main principles which are clearly stated in section 
1 as:  obtainment of fair, speedy, impartial and cost effective dispute resolution; party 
autonomy and court minimal intervention. Mance LJ in Department of Economics 
Policy and Development of the City of Moscow v Bankers Trust Co15 explained that: 
‘Parliament has set out, in the Arbitration Act 1996, to encourage and facilitate 
a reformed and more independent, as well as private and confidential, system 
of consensual dispute resolution, with only limited possibilities of court 




                                                 
11 Johan Steyn,(the Hon. Mr Justice), “Arbitration in England: the Current Issues” 15 I.B.L 432 p 435 
12 Report of June 1989 of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law under the 
Chairmanship of the Lord Justice Mustill 
13 The Rt. Hon the Lord Hacking, “Arbitration Law Reform: the Impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on the English Arbitration Act 1996”, Arbitration Vol. 63 No 4 pp 291-299  
14 ibid 
15 [2004] ECWA Civ 314 at para 31 
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IV. The Model Law and the English Arbitration Act 1996 Compared 
Scope of Application 
As already mentioned above, the Model Law aims to regulate international 
commercial arbitration whereas the 1996 Act applies to any arbitration whether 
domestic or international, whether commercial or non-commercial. The Model Law is 
driven towards “the need for uniformity” which “is greater regarding international 
arbitration than domestic arbitration and that states may be more inclined to preserve 
their traditional concepts and familiar rules in a purely domestic context than in 
international cases”.16 The “internationality” of the arbitration is the first converging 
point of these two documents. An arbitration assumes an international status, under 
the Model Law, when the parties have their places of business in different States or 
when the place of arbitration is situated outside the places of business of the parties or 
when the subject matter of the agreement is related  to more than one States. This 
definition, it has been argued is “confusing, unworkable and unnecessary and will 
merely give rise to litigation at the outset”.17   The 1996 Act prefers a “monist” 
approach and does not deem it necessary to have separate legal regimes which cater 
for international commercial arbitration on one hand and all other types of consensual 
arbitration on other hand.18   
 
Territorial Application 
The 1996 Act applies to arbitrations where the ‘seat of the arbitration’ is in England 
and Wales or Northern Ireland and to arbitration that does not have seat in England to 
enable parties to overseas arbitrations to apply to stay legal proceeding in England 
and to enforce foreign arbitral awards.19 The Model Law will apply “if the place of 
arbitration is in the territory of this (adopting) State” save provisions of articles 8(1) 
and 9 that deal with recognition of arbitral agreements and their compatibility with 
interim measures of protection. These provisions and articles 35 and 36 on 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral award will apply in the place of arbitration 
                                                 
16 Lord Justice Mustill (now Lord Mustill) “the United Kingdom and the UNCITRAL Model Law: The 
Mustill Committees’ Consultative Document of October 1987 on the Model Law (1987) 2 Arbitration 
International 278-297  
17 See note 14 at page 17 
18 Compare to Federal Law of 24 July 2002 No. 102 FZ, Concerning Arbitral Tribunals in the Russian 
Federation which was separately enacted to cater for domestic arbitration. 
19 See sections 2 and 3 1996 Act 
 7
either it is in adopting State or in another State, even the place of arbitration has not 
been determined.  
 
The Model Law conservatively upholds the principle of territoriality; the 1996 Act 
recognises both territoriality and delocalization of arbitration. A short summary would 
suffice in demystifying this aspect of the work otherwise a comprehensive exploration 
of these two principles would change the focus of this essay in its entirety; 
Territoriality supports the fact that every arbitration takes place within a specific 
territory and must conform at minimum to the mandatory part of the lex arbitri. 
Territoriality ensures that states through their courts maintain their supervisory roles.  
This will not only guarantee fairness but permits the court to provide assistance 
necessary to move the arbitral process forward. Delocalisation, on the other hand 
advocates detachment of arbitral process from municipal law. This is necessitated by 
the argument that international arbitration should not be fettered by the law of the seat 
of arbitration. It must be noted that despite the fact that the debate on territoriality-
delocalisation dichotomy has been on for years, the definition of delocalisation is 
more obscured than clear. While some scholars believe that delocalisation represents a 
total detachment of the arbitral process from municipal law and constitutes a 
‘dangerous heresy’, 20  others such as Jan Paulsson 21  see it attaching only to the 
jurisdiction where the enforcement of award is sought.  
 
Prior to the 1996 Act delocalisation was seen as impossible and practically 
unachievable. Mann explained that ‘…every right or power a private person 
(arbitrators) enjoys is inexorably conferred by or derived from a system of municipal 
law which may conveniently be called …the lex arbitri.’22  This view was given 
credence by Kerr LJ in Bank Mellat v Helliniki Techniki when he said that ‘our 
jurisprudence does not recognise the concept of arbitral procedures floating in the 
transactional firmament unconnected with any other municipal system of law.’ 23 
Section 2 of the English Arbitration Act therefore constitutes a radical departure from 
                                                 
20 W Park, ‘The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration’, 32 (1983) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 21 
21 J Paulsson, ‘Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why it Matters’, 
(1983) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53.  
22 F Mann, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law - Lex Facit Arbitrum,’ 2 Arbitration International  (1986), pp. 
244-251  
23 [1984]QB 291,301 
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the earlier views. The English court can stay legal proceedings or enforce arbitral 
awards where the seat is outside England or where no seat has been designated as if 
the seat were within England.24 The court can also exercise its power by securing the 
attendance of witnesses and assist the tribunal in taking and preserving evidence.25 
Subsection 4 takes it further that the court may exercise any power for the purpose of 
supporting arbitral award process where no seat has been stipulated or agreed and by 




Arbitrability constitutes one of the grips of municipal law on arbitration process. 
Disputes can only be resolved in private spheres to the extent permitted under the 
national law.  For the purpose of our discussion it means whether the applicable law 
allows certain dispute to be determined by arbitration. This is what is known as 
objective arbitrability.26 Arbitrability of disputes is based on a country’s economic, 
political and social policy. Some Arab countries have conferred exclusive 
jurisdictions on their national courts to resolve disputes arising from contracts 
between their parastatal and foreign corporations.  Law governing arbitrability would 
normally include the law governing the arbitration agreement, the law of the seat of 
arbitration, that law governing the parties and the law of the place of the enforcement 
of arbitration.  
 
Article 1(5) of the Model Law excludes from its operation any disputes which may 
not be submitted to arbitration (statutory arbitration) by virtue of any other law of the 
State. Therefore what is arbitrable is under the remit of the State party adopting the 
Model Law.  The general notion is that some disputes were not susceptible to 
resolution by private arbitration because they were exclusively within the jurisdiction 
of a court or other tribunal. According to the New South Wales Supreme Court in 
Australia, Those cases arose where there was ‘the presence of a sufficient element of 
legitimate public interest in the subject matter of the dispute to make its private 
                                                 
24 The English Arbitration Act1996  s2(2) 
25 Ibid sections 43 and 44 
26 As opposed to subjective arbitrability which focus on whether the dispute being considered by the 
arbitral tribunal has been agreed on by the parties.  
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resolution outside the national court inappropriate.27 The Singaporean court held that 
issues like citizenship, legitimacy of marriage, grant of statutory licences, validity of 
registration of trademarks or patents, copyright winding-up of companies and other 
matters with public interests elements may not be arbitrable.28 Under the Philippines 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2004,29 the following matters are not subject to 
any of the ADR mechanisms ‘labour disputes, civil status of persons, validity of 
marriage, ground for legal separation jurisdiction of courts, future legitime 
[inheritance expectation], criminal liability, and those which law cannot be 
compromised. Unlike the Singaporean and the Philippines approaches, the Japanese 
Act adopts an inclusive approach. It provides that ‘an arbitration agreement shall be 
valid only when its subject matter is a civil dispute that may be resolved by settlement 
between the parties (excluding that of divorce or separation).30   
 
The 1996 Act expressly leaves it to the courts to develop rules on the issue of 
arbitrability. According to s.81(1), “[N]othing in this Part shall be construed as 
excluding the operation of any rule of law consistent with the provisions of this Part, 
in particular, any rule of law as to (a) matters which are not capable of settlement by 
arbitration…”31 Thus areas such as civil status, liability for criminal offences are 
outside the coverage of English Arbitration Act. In Soleimany v Soleimany Waller LJ 
noted that some “illegal or immoral” dealings are “incapable of being arbitrated from 
an English law perspective because an agreement to arbitrate them would itself be 
illegal or contrary to public policy.”32 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that the 
arbitration agreement was valid notwithstanding that the contract was contrary to the 
revenue laws and export controls of the country of performance.  
 
The two systems agree in the area but the role of national laws prevents a specific 
determination of what is arbitrable and what is not.  Arbitrability continues to evolve 
under case laws and legislations. Arbitrability of disputes relating to competition, 
                                                 
27 Larkden Pty Ltd v Lloyd Energy System Pty Ltd [2011] New South Wales Supreme Court 268 
28 Aloe Vera of America Inc v Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 174 AT 205 
29 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2004 (Republic Act No. 9285) Chapter 1 Section 6 
30 Japanese Arbitration Act 2003, Article 13(1) available 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/arbitrationlaw.pdf accessed on 10 February 2012  
31 Such matters are to be defined by common law. 
32 [1999] QB 785 at 797 
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securities transaction, intellectual property rights, bribery and fraud is still not settled 
under the law.   
 
Waiver 
Article 433 of the Model Law regulates waiver of the right to object. In a dispute 
between an Austrian buyer and a Hungarian seller over a contract for the purchase and 
sale of sour cherries, the court held that the tribunal had properly exercised its 
jurisdiction on the matter because the buyer failed to object the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal when it submitted its defence to the claims.34   Section 7335 is the English 
corollary to Article 4. The Model Law requires an actual knowledge and “without 
undue delay”, but section 73 expects the party contesting the absence of waiver to 
prove that even with reasonable diligence he would not have been aware  of the 
grounds for objection. It was held in Athletic Union of Constantinople v National 
Basketball Association36 that under s73(1) an applicant is deemed to have waived any 
ground of objection based on jurisdiction that could have been raised but was not 
raised.  These provisions are a machinery to defeat the delay tactics and technicalities 
which are prevalent in litigation. First, they ensure that the issues of jurisdiction are 
raised at an early stage and thereby potentially save time and costs. Second, they 
ensure fairness and openness and the possibility of remedying the defect if raised at an 
early stage. Therefore where an applicant took part in an ad hoc arbitration but later 
sough to challenge the award on the basis that the consent of the signature of 
Georgian government was not given and as such unlawful under the Georgian law, the 
                                                 
33 “ A party who knows that any provision of this Law from which the  parties may derogate or any    
       requirement under the arbitration   agreement has not been complied with and yet proceeds with     
      the  arbitration without stating his objection to such non-compliance  without undue delay or, if a   
      time-limit is provided therefor, within  such period of time, shall be deemed to have waived his     
      right to object”. 
34 Hungary: Arbitration Court attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Arbitral 
award in case No. Vb/97142 of 25 May 1999 CLOUT Case No 266avaibale at 
http://interarb.com/clout/clout266.htm  accessed on 18  March 2012 
35(1) If a party to arbitral proceedings takes part, or continues to take part, in the proceedings without 
making, either forthwith or within such time as is allowed by the arbitration agreement or the tribunal 
or by any provision of this Part, any objection - 
(a) that the tribunal lacks substantive jurisdiction,  
(b) that the proceedings have been improperly conducted,  
(c) that there has been a failure to comply with the arbitration agreement or with any provision of this 
Part, or 
(d) that there has been any other irregularity affecting the tribunal or the proceedings, 
he may not raise that objection later, before the tribunal or the court, unless he shows that, at the time 
he took part or continued to take part in the proceedings, he did not know and could not with 
reasonable diligence have discovered the grounds for the objection.  
36  [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 305 
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judge dismissed the application and held that the illegality was or ought to have been 
known to the applicant by the start of the arbitration and has thus waived his right to 
object.37  
 
Extent of Court Intervention 
Resort to arbitration by parties indicates they have ousted the jurisdiction of the court 
as agreed in their arbitration agreement. The influence of jurisdictional theory on the 
juridical nature of arbitration shows the ousting is only to the extent permitted by the 
municipal law or the lex arbitri.  In the past the courts were known for extensive 
judicial intervention. This for example discouraged parties from choosing London as a 
forum of arbitration.38 Both section 1(c) of the 1996 Act and Article 5 of the Model 
Law are a response to paternalistic approach of many courts. Unlike the Art 5 of the 
Model Law which provides that “No court shall intervene except when so provided.” 
Art.1(c) of 1996 Act says, “In matters governed by this Part the court should not 
interfere except as provided by this Part.” The Model Law gives courts a narrow room 
for intervention. Conversely, the 1996 Act permits a wider scope of judicial 
intervention.  
 
The role of the English court is limited to one of support even where the tribunal has 
made an error on question of fact. Under the Model Law, except for challenge and 
termination of arbitrator (Arts 11, 13 and 14), jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (Art 
16), setting aside of the arbitral awards under Art 34, courts are not allowed to 
intervene.39 Ruling on its own International Commercial Arbitration Act which has 
adopted the Model Law, the Ontario Court of Justice ruled that the interpretation of an 
arbitration agreement is a matter for the arbitral tribunal.40 Here, the argument was on 
the tribunal’s ability to construe a contractual relationship on the basis of the written 
clauses of the agreement. The plaintiff asked the court for rectification of a provision 
of the arbitration agreement or alternatively to declare that the relevant provision was 
void on the ground that it contained a draft error and did not actually reflect the 
                                                 
37 JSC Zestafoni G Nikoladze Ferralloy Plant v Ronly Holdings Ltd [2004] EWHC 245 (Comm) 
38 See DAC Report, February 1997, at para 21 
39 Other instances of intervention permitted by the Model are recognition of the arbitration agreement 
and its compatibility with court ordered interim measures of protection Arts 8 and 9, and recognition of 
arbitral awards Arts 35 and 36. 
40 Case 69, Ontario Court of Justice General Division January 2004, 1994 (Blair J) Case Law on 
UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), available at www.uncitral.org (accessed 30 November 2011) 
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intention of the parties. The court concluded that this is a task for the tribunal after 
which the court can decide if the “award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or 
not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration” as provided by art 34(2) 
(iii) of the Model Law.41 
 
Bridle J clarified the extent of judicial intervention under both the Model Law and the 
1996 Act in an English case of Runman Faruqi -v- Commonwealth Secretariat.42 The 
honourable judge explained that the word “shall” has not been used. The word 
“should” has quite deliberately been used in the English Act, which indicates that 
there may be some situations…in which the court might intervene other than those 
provided specifically in Part 1 of the Act, but those are by their very nature going to 
be situation which rarely occur, and the strong general principle is against 
intervention.”43 So as observed the restrictive scope of the Model Law is narrower 
than the corresponding provision of the 1996 Act. 44  While restrictive court 
intervention is compatible with spirit of speedy resolution, this becomes problematic 
in advanced legal systems as it gives uncontrollable powers to arbitrators. Besides, its 
total adoption would also be a retrograde step to these systems.45 In case of systems at 
budding stage, Model Law would constitute a valuable legislative “package” to 
transform them into suitable international arbitration venues.46  
 
Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal: Competence-Competence and Separability 
The doctrines of competence-competence and separability 47  are part of both the 
Model Law and the 1996 Act. Competence-competence refers to the extent to which 
an arbitral tribunal may rule on its jurisdiction. This does not indicate the power of the 
tribunal to make a final and binding decision to arbitrate the matter but to adopt an 
initial ruling on its own jurisdiction. “Separability” or “autonomy” or “independence” 
of an arbitration clause on the other hand confers jurisdiction on an arbitrator who 
                                                 
41 Jean-Paul Beraudo, “Case Law on Articles 5, 8 and 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration 
Law” Journal of International Arbitration 23(1): 101-114 
42 [2002] WL 498805 (QBD(Comm. Ct)  
43 ibid 
44 Alan Reid, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the English 
Arbitration Act: Are the Two Systems Poles Apart? Journal of International Tribunal Vol. 21 No 3 
(2004) pp 227-237 
45 See note 14 at p 16 
46 ibid 
47 See J. Paulsson (ed) International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration Suppl 11 (January/1990) at 
pp70-72 
 13
stays within the limits of his jurisdiction though the contract in which the arbitration 
clause is contained is invalid.  Article 16(1) provides that   “The arbitration tribunal 
may rule on its own jurisdiction including any objections with respect to existence or 
validity of the arbitration agreement…a decision by the arbitration tribunal shall not 
entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause”. 
 
In England section 30 of 1996 Act allows an arbitral tribunal to rule on its substantive 
jurisdiction subject to court intervention under the sections 32 and 37. 48  The 
intervention of the court is predicated on the timely objection or otherwise of the 
complaining party 49  and the agreement in writing of all other parties to the 
proceeding.50 The Model Law on the other hand stipulates 30days for a disputant to 
appeal if not satisfied with the tribunal finding that it has jurisdiction.51 While these 
provisions of the 1996 Act may save time and money, they put one of the parties in 
advantageous position over the other. A party who is sure of benefiting from the 
arbitral tribunal competence would not agree to a court reviewing the tribunal’s 
competence. What would happen if a court of the country that adopts the Model Law 
rules that it lacks jurisdiction? The Model Law is silent on this; this should 
automatically revive the concerned national court jurisdiction 
 
As regards “separability” of the arbitration clause from the rest of the contract, both 
the Model Law and English Arbitration Act validate an agreement though the contract 
which created it is invalid in itself. Courts have applied these provisions- s16 (3) 
Model Law and s7 1996 Act - that arbitration clause is autonomous from the contract 
in which it is contained and its validity is not determined by the validity of the 
contract that created it.52 In Vee Networks Limited -v- Econet Wireless International 
Limited, 53 the parties had entered into a Technical Support Agreement (“TSA”). Vee 
applied under s67 of the 1996 Act that the partial award granted by the arbitrators 
                                                 
48 See also s16(3) Model Law 
49 S73(1)1996 Act 
50 ibid s32(2) 
51 Note 27 Cf Courts have however ruled that if a party does not raise objections to the existence of an 
arbitration agreement at the latest in the submission of the statement of defence, such party is precluded 
from raising this objection in an application for setting aside under article 34 of the Model Law, 
CLOUT case No. 148, Russian Federation, 10 February 1995; Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, Germany, 1 
Sch 16/01 (1), 20 December 2001 
52 CLOUT Case No 27 [Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Commercial] Argentina, 26 September 
1988 
53 [2004] EWHC 2909 (Comm.)14 December 2004  
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should be set aside arguing that if the “TSA” were ultra vires, the Arbitrators had no 
jurisdiction conclusively to determine any of the preliminary issues because their 
jurisdiction was derived from the arbitral clause in the “TSA”. The court confirming 
s7 held that a ruling on the validity of the host contract does not –in and of itself affect 
the validity of its arbitration clause.   
 
The Model Law relates “separability” to the arbitral tribunal’s determination of its 
own jurisdiction using the word “for that purpose” but the 1996 Act is drafted broadly 
and does not distinguish between the determination of the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal by the arbitral tribunal itself or by the courts.54 This should not be interpreted 
to mean that separability does not also apply to courts.55 
 
Making of Award and Termination of Proceedings 
Provisions for rules to govern the substance of dispute are the same under both the 
Model Law and the 1996 Act; both confer authorities on the parties to decide the 
applicable rules of law.56 In the absence of agreement by the parties, the arbitrators 
must apply the law determined by the conflict of rules which they deem appropriate57 
but not necessarily the conflict of rules at the place of arbitration. Does the applicable 
law include or exclude lex mercatoria?  
 
Lex mercatoria is “a set of general principle and customary rules … elaborated in the 
framework of international trade, without reference to a particular national system of 
law”.58 Soderlund,59 while agreeing with Shackleton60 that these provisions favour 
                                                 
54 Section 7 of the 1996 Act provides: “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration 
agreement which forms or was intended to form part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) 
shall not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because that other agreement is invalid, or 
did not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that purpose be treated as a 
distinct agreement”. 
55 H. M. Holtzmann and J. E. Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law, Deventer 1989), p. 305. 
56 See article 28(1) Model Law and Section 46(1)(a) 1996 Act 
57 See article 28(2) Model Law and section 46 (3) 1996 Act 
58 See Goldman, Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (1983), cited in Husain M. Al-
Baharna, “International Commercial Arbitration in a Changing World”, Arab Law Quarterly Review 
Vol. 9, No. (1994) PP. 144-157 at p145 
59 Christer Soderlund, “ A Comparative Overview of Arbitration Laws: Swedish Arbitration Act 1999, 
English Arbitration Act 1996 and Russian Federal Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1993” 
Arbitration International Vol. 20, No 1(2004)  p 82 
60 Stewart R. Shackleton, “The applicable law in International Arbitration Under the New English 
Arbitration Act 1996”  Vol.13 No.4 (1997) Arbitration International Vol. 20, No 1 p375-390 
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application of national law, concludes that lex mercatoria such as UNIDROIT 
Contract Principles are excluded. The drafting history corroborates that “while some 
(States parties) representatives would have preferred an even wider interpretation or 
an even broader formula to include for example, general legal principles or case law 
developed in arbitration awards, the Working Group, after deliberations, agreed that 
this was too far-reaching to be acceptable to many states, at least for the time 
being. ”61  The “rules of law” as used under article 28(1) has a broader connotation 
compared to ‘the law’. This Shackleton explains includes custom, trade usages, the 
rules of business associations, codes of conduct, general principles of law, lex 
mercatoria or rules of law and practice recognised and developed by international 
arbitration.62  
 
Another issue on the applicable law is whether the arbitrators decide the dispute on 
the basis of equity and fairness, that is, acting ex aequo et bono or as amiable 
composituer63 This is in the affirmative provided they have the express permission of 
the parties- the implication of this permission is the express exclusion by parties of the 
right of appeal to the court because there is no question of law to appeal. According to 
the drafting history (travaux preparatoires) of the Model Law the advantage is that “it 
does not entail a risk for any unwary party unfamiliar with this type of arbitration 
since an express authorisation by the parties is required”.64 In Home and Overseas 
Insurance Co. Ltd v. Mentor Insurance Co. (UK) Ltd65  the Court of Appeal decided 
in favour of an agreement for arbitration in England which required the arbitrators to 
interpret the contract as "an honourable agreement”.66 Also the court approved the 
decision of a US67 arbitral tribunal in Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London –v- 
BCS Insurance Company68 decision applying article 28 (3) of the Model Law. An 
                                                 
61 Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the Work of its Sixth Session 
(Vienna, August 29- September 9, 1983), U.N.Doc. A/CN.9/245 paragraph 94 (September 22, 1983) 
62 See also H. M. Holtzmann and J. E. Neuhaus pp 764-807  
63 This is otherwise known as “equity clause” or “honourable engagement clause”. 
64 Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Arbitration, Report of the 
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 Article  32, para 1 March 25, 1985 reprinted in H. M. 
Holtzmann and J. E. Neuhaus pp. 884,884 
65 [I990] 1 W.L.R. 153; this case was decided before the English Arbitration Act 1996 came into force. 
66 Emphasis supplied.  
67 United States has not enacted the Model Law. Arbitration in many states of the US is governed by 
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 with amendments to incorporate New York and Panama 
Conventions. However California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon and 
Texas have enacted some form of Model Law.  
68 239 F. Supp. 2d 812 (N.D. Ill. 2003)                                                                                                                                            
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insurance company had inter alia sought the vacation of an arbitral award based on 
“equitable determination” when it was not part of the Agreements. Rejecting the 
request, the court held that while the decision did not ignore the rule of law, the 
insurance company had waived its objection because it had also appealed to “business 
fairness” for the tribunal to rule in its favour.  
 
Decision Making 
In an arbitral tribunal with more than one arbitrator, its decision shall be by majority 
of all its members under the Model Law.69 Decisions on questions of procedure may 
be left, with other members of the panel agreement, to be determined by the presiding 
arbitrator.70  Like the Model Law, arbitral decision shall also be made by the majority 
under the 1996 Act, section 20(3). 
 
The 1996 Act makes provision for the post of the chairman and goes further to 
incorporate an umpire to the proceedings. The chairman has a casting vote where 
neither unanimity nor a majority decision could be reached under subsection 3. The 
problem with allowing a chairman of arbitration to have a prevailing view is that there 
may be instance of connivance with any of the party to the proceedings. Though it 
could be argued that the presence of an umpire may forestall such connivance, this 
also has its own limitation especially where Act fails to provide rules governing the 
selection of the umpire. An umpire under the 1996 Act could replace the arbitrators as 
if he were a sole arbitrator with power to make decisions, orders and awards in the 
event of their failure to agree on a matter relating to the arbitration.  
 
Termination/Settlement 
Like article 32, section 51(1) and (2) provides for the termination or settlement of the 
proceedings. An arbitration proceeding comes to an end either by the “final award” or 
by an “order of the tribunal” upon occurrence of any of the instances in article 32 (2) 
(a)-(c).  When could we say an award could be said to be final? Neither of documents 
provides a definition and the decision of Singaporean Court of Appeal in Tang v Tan71 
did not resolve the issue. In the case an arbitrator had made an award in which he 
                                                 
69 Article 29 
70 ibid 
71 [2001] 3 S.L.R 237 (Sing. Ct App. 2001), reversing [2001]1 S.L.R 624 (Sing. High Ct 2000) 
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dismissed both the claimant’s claim and the respondent’s counterclaim on 10 January 
2000. The arbitrator made additional awards on 17 January 2000 and 6 March 2000 
respectively. In the latter award, the arbitrator resolved the issue of cost, reversed 
himself on the counterclaim and proceeded to award A$1.3 million to the respondents. 
On application to the Singaporean High Court by the claimant that the arbitrator 
lacked authority to revisit the January 10 award, the award was set aside on the 
ground that the arbitrator had become functus officio and could not recall or reverse 
the award. On a further appeal to the Singaporean Court of Appeal, the decision of the 
High Court was reversed rejecting “the concept of partial functus officio”. The court 
said “the final award must be the one that completes everything that the arbitral 
tribunal is expected to decide including the question of cost…until such award is 
given, the arbitral tribunal’s mandate continues; it is not functus officio”.  
 
With due respect to their lordship, the reversion is erroneous on the basic principles of 
law. The term “final award” could refer to (i) the decision of the court that terminates 
all the proceedings and decides all claims made by the parties and (ii) the decision 
which settles part of the proceedings but with a binding effect on that particular aspect 
of the proceedings.72 Though the 1996 Act does not mention the right of the claimant 
to withdraw his claim, this should however be contemplated in subsection 2 which 
provides that “the tribunal shall terminate the substantive proceedings and, if so 
requested by the parties”.  
 
Upon the tribunal reaching a final decision, article 33(1) of the Model Law and 
section 57 of the 1996 Act afford the tribunal to correct “any errors in computation, 
any clerical or typographical errors of similar nature” within thirty days and twenty-
eight days respectively. Thus in Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Commission v. Genius 
Joel Maposa,73 the appellant sought to have an award set aside on the basis that the 
arbitrator had made a reviewable factual error in calculating the back pay of the 
respondent. The court dismissing the appeal found that the error was clearly one of 
computation for which the Model Law makes adequate provision and not contrary to 
                                                 
72 That is an interim or interlocutory decision of a tribunal or court. This decision has been criticised by 
various scholars. For example see Lawrence G.S. Boo, “Arbitration” (2001) 2 SAL Ann Rev.24 at pp 
33-35 
73 CLOUT Case 267 Zimbabwe: Harare High Court (Judge Devittie); Judgment No. HH23198 accessed 
from available  http://interarb.com/clout/clout267.htm accessed on 1 March 2012 
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public policy as contested; a party may request the tribunal to correct such errors and, 
if necessary, the time limits for making such a request may be extended. The arbitral 
tribunal can also make an additional award, where it is found justified, either at the 
party request or the tribunal initiative. The Model Law stipulates sixty days while the 
1996 Act, fifty-six days.  Notably, the 1996 Act does not provide for “interpretation 
of a specific point or part of the award” which article 31(1) (b) of Model Law 
provides for, the power of the tribunal is limited to correction of clerical errors. The 
Model Law provision is superfluous because both the correction of errors and award 
tend towards the restoration of the true meaning of the award.74 This provision is 
prone to abuse as a powerful party may use it to reopen the case and subvert the 
award already made. Either the interpretation or the additional award shall form part 
of the main award and shall be in the format provided in article 31 of the Model Law 
and Sections 52-54 of the 1996 Act. 
 
Recourse Against Award 
When can a court confirm, vary or reject an award made by an arbitral tribunal? 
Article 34 of the Model Law and sections 67-69 of the 1996 Act specify instances 
when the court can be invited to set an arbitral award aside.75 An arbitral award could 
be challenged under the 1996 Act on “serious irregularity” affecting “the tribunal”, 
“the proceedings” and “the award”. Examples of acts that could constitute serious 
irregularity are listed in subsection 2. The right of appeal could be invoked subject to 
the provision of section 70(2) and (3).  
 
Section 69 provides for appeal on a point of law subject to leave of court if and only if 
the arbitration has its seat in England and Wales. Disputing parties may exclude the 
jurisdiction of the court either by agreement or default, where their agreement 
dispenses with the reason for arbitral award. Though an arbitral tribunal is not 
analogous to a court of law that must state reasons for its decisions, in practice 
dispensing with reasons of an arbitral decision is not of common place. Under the 
Model Law, an award could be set aside based on incapacity of any of the parties to 
the agreement, violation of principles of fair trial, derogation from the terms of the 
                                                 
74 David A.R. Williams and Amy Buchanan, Correction and Interpretation of Award Under Article 33 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law Vol. 4 No 4 Int. A.L.R. 119 at 124 (2001)  
75 Article 34(1), “Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for 
setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article”. 
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submission to arbitration and agreed arbitral procedure, the subject matter is outside 
arbitration power according to the law of the adopting State or the award is contrary 
to public policy.   
 
Both the Model Law and the 1996 Act recognise setting an award aside on the ground 
of being contrary to “public policy”. Reaching agreement on what constitutes public 
policy is problematic even under a specific jurisprudence and not even an 
encompassing one as it may arise under international commercial arbitration. The 
term “public policy” has always been treated as an umbrella provision which 
encompasses all reasons a losing party may think of. As Cairns noted, “It has often 
been relied upon as a 'catch-all' in applications to set aside primarily based on other 
grounds or as a redundant means to re-express arguments made primarily on other 
grounds.” 76  In Protech Projects Construction (Pty) Ltd v Al-Kharafi & Sons 
Mohammed Abdulmoshin Al-Kharafi & Sons WLL v Big Dig Construction 
(Proprietary) Ltd (In Liquidation),77 upon five separate awards being made by the 
arbitral tribunal in favour of the defendant, the claimant under section 68 applied to 
the court to have the awards set aside. One of the grounds put forward by the claimant 
was that material documents relating to the assignment had not been disclosed by the 
defendant and, that therefore, the award had been procured in a way "contrary to 
public policy" pursuant to section 68(2)(g) of the Act. Rejecting the assertion of the 
claimant, the court held that conduct was only "contrary to public policy" if it 
involved more than inadvertence or something which could readily be described as 
unconscionable or reprehensible and of which it found no evidence of such acts from 
the facts. The court in Re Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones, S.A. de C.V. et 
al. and STET International, S.p.A. et al78 that the public policy ground would include 
instances where enforcement would violate basic notions of morality and justice of 
which corruption, bribery or fraud so also is an infringement of the applicant's right to 
be heard.79 
 
                                                 
76 DAVID J. A. CAIRNS, “The Spanish Application of UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration” Arbitration International, Vol. 22, No. 4 pp 573-595 at  592 
77 [2005] WL 2608249 (QBD (Comm Ct)  
78 Canada: Superior Court of Justice (Lax J.)  CLOUT case No 391 available at  
http://interarb.com/clout/clout391.htm  accessed  on 1 March 2012  
79 Germany: Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht; 4 Z Sch 23/99 CLOUT Case No 375 accessed from 
http://interarb.com/clout/clout375.htm accessed  on 1 March 2012 
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V. Conclusion 
It might not be appropriate drawing a wide conclusion that the Model Law is 
preferable to the 1996 Act or vice versa neither could be a reasonable assertion that 
the 1996 is an instrument borne of legislative arrogance. What could be established is 
that both instruments of law share a great number of similarities with a couple of 
divergent approaches. It is indubitable that the 1996 Act provides a competent and 
efficient statutory framework for international as well as domestic arbitrations but the 
Model Law limits its reach to the international context. This as observed above is 
dictated by eagerness of states parties to preserve their traditional concepts and 
familiar rules. While the 1996 Act reflects the reluctance of the English courts to 
release its hold on judicial intervention in disputes settlement, the Model Law dwells 
on the autonomy of the arbitral tribunal. The question of the role of lex mercatoria has 
not been addressed by either of the provisions. None of the two is a paragon of perfect 
legislative instrument because they have grounds where they have failed. 
Nevertheless, they complement each other and they represent a commendable 
package of arbitral rules which reflect the flexibility and expediency yearned by 
disputants in dispute resolution settings.         
 
